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Over the last half a century, China witnessed very rapid fertility transition. Its total 
fertility rate declined from around 6 in the 1960s down to below replacement level in the 
1990s and has maintained at such a low level since then. The Chinese fertility transition 
is characterised by its rapidity and strong government intervention, and has profound 
Impacts on China’s socioeconomic development.  
  
I. Past and current fertility in China 
 
Although large family used to be desired by Chinese culture, the natural fertility 
level in China was never as high as that recorded in the Hutterites population.  According 
to historical studies, the TFR in the natural fertility regime was around 7-8 in Chinese 
society
1.  High fertility was balanced by high mortality, which resulted in slow and 
undulated population growth in Chinese history.    
The 1950s and the 1960s witnessed very high fertility, except for the period of 1959 
- 1961 when mismanagement and natural disaster caused massive excess mortality and 
very low fertility (Peng, Xizhe, 1987).  China’s nation-wide fertility transition started in 
the early 1970s, which was initialised by the government sponsored family planning 
programme. The national total fertility rate declined sharply from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 
1979, a more than fifty per cent decrease. This is one of the rapidest fertility declines ever 
recorded in the world. While the government programme has played a crucial role in 
bringing down Chinese fertility, the fundamental changes that have taken place in 
China’s socio-economic structure since 1950 have also undermined the century-long 
reproductive norms and paved the way to the fertility reduction.  
                                                           
1 For example, see Zhongwei Zhao, ‘Deliberate Birth Control Under a High-fertility Regime: Reproductive 
Behavior in China before 1970’, Population and Development Review, 23(4): 729-767   2
It is often assumed that once fertility transition has started, the momentum would 
maintain and fertility will inevitably reach replacement level (Cleland & Wilson, 1987). 
However, China’s marked fertility reduction that had occurred in the 1970s did not get 
the same momentum into the 1980s, despite government efforts in implementing the 
much more rigid family planning regulation, the so-called “One-Child per family” 
programme. The potential for fertility decline created by the socio-economic changes of 
1950-70s seems to be exhausted by the 1980s, leading to a TFR fluctuating between 2.3-
2.9. 
Patterns of fertility transition in the 1980s indicate that China might have experienced 
two different kinds of fertility decline in these two decades. While the decline in the 1970s 
was mainly from very high to low fertility, the 1980s witnessed a decline from low to near 
or even below replacement-level fertility. The two kinds of fertility decline cannot be 
considered different only in the numerical sense. It seems that the early transition is relative 
easier and could proceed fast in a very short time period, but the later is much more difficult 
and requires somewhat more fundamental shift in socio-economic condition and the value 
system related to reproduction.  
The early 1990s witnessed another nation-wide downward trend of fertility, with the 
coastal ‘opened-up’ areas at the fore. This new wave of fertility decline is certainly 
benefited from the economic reform and social changes generated from economic 
development. Moreover, the impact of the re-affirmed government commitment to 
population control should never be under-estimated. According to official statistics, the 
TFR was reduced from 2.3 in 1990 to 2.0 in 1992, and has remained below replacement 
level since then.   
It has been a subject of controversy whether fertility in China was dropping as 
rapidly as indicated by the official statistics. Some demographers argue that the official 
birth statistics are subject to serious undercounting (Attane & Sun 1999). The State 
Family Planning Commission may be the only government agency in China that openly 
admits the problems in its statistics and tries to correct them. The commission has 
conducted annual random survey to double check quality of population data and made 
great efforts to improve the accuracy of statistics. Results from these surveys varied 
widely between provinces and regions. In areas like Shanghai and Jiangsu, it was   3
reported that more than 99 per cent of the births were registered, while underreporting 
could mount to more than 20 per cent in some other rural locations
2.   
 It is interesting to note that the total fertility rates of the 1990s that were derived 
from several national surveys, both conducted by the State Statistics Bureau and the State 
Family Planning Commission, were consistently around 1.6, in spite of changes in 
sample selection and methods of field work
3. These estimates to some extent are in 
contradiction to people’s general impression on China’s reality as 2 or 3 children per 
family is still a prevailed phenomenon in many rural areas. So far, there is no single 
estimation of TFR that is widely accepted by the scholars. However, the publicised 
official figure, say TFR around 1.7-1.8, in my opinion and also commonly cited by 
researchers, is not far away from the reality
4. 
 
 Figure 1 about here  
 
Big rural-urban gap in total fertility rate emerged firstly in the early 1960s when the 
compensational fertility surge was not occurred in the same magnitude in the urban area. 
In the cities, the contraceptive and other birth control services were available in the 1960s 
that led to the earlier fertility decline in China’s urban area. The reproductive behaviour 
has continued to be differentiated between China’s rural and urban population that could 
be mainly attributed to the factors linked to differential policy measures and 
socioeconomic settings. By now, while the one child per couple is a common practice in 
Chinese cities, two children per family is the general phenomenon in China’s countryside.   
There are always marked regional variations in fertility among China’s provincial 
units, but the gap has been narrowing in the recent years.  This phenomenon is clearly 
associated with the different path of fertility transition among China’s provincial units. 
While big municipalities such as Shanghai and Beijing began their fertility decline as 
                                                           
2 As these surveys were conducted in small scale, these data could not be used to represent the provincial 
features of birth reporting, or to infer to the national pattern.  
3 These surveys include 1992 Fertility Survey (Sample size of  380,000 ) conducted by the State Family 
Planning Commission, and 1995 1% National  Population Sample Survey, etc. 
4 It is unwise at present to discuss the issue of real fertility rate, as valid data sets are not adequately 
available. In a Chinese Government Directive issued in March 2000, it just simply indicates that China’s 
fertility is below ‘replacement level’.  See also Yu Xuejun & Xie Zhenming  eds.  China’s Population 
Development Review, P. 41-43đBeijing: People’s Publishing House, 2000.    4
early as in the early 1960s, fertility transition only started in 1980s in some of the western 
provinces. Even with this regional variation, it seems clear that there has been a general 
trend of fertility convergence over time, which is evidenced by the decline of the fertility 
variance among provinces.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Fertility level remains quite different between ethnic population groups. As birth 
control has long been vigorously implemented among the majority Han population, family 
planning programme has just started its formation for some minority nationalities (such as 
Tibet population). Among China's 55 minority groups, the fertility levels of Korea and 
Manchu women were very low, but were the highest among the Uygur and Kazak 
nationalities. The relative high fertility is one of the main causes that resulting in the 
increased share of China’s minority population among the total population.  
 
II. The role of government population policy and programme  
 
China’s general population policy at present can be described as ‘Controlling 
population quantity, improving the quality of life, and make efforts to solve aging 
problem’. The family planning programme is the core of China's national population 
programme, which is mainly managed by the State Population and Family Planning 
Commission with support from other government agencies and various NGOs such as 
China Family Planning Association and All-China Women's Federation etc.  
The success of China’s birth control has for a long time been heavily depended on 
government administrative intervention. The programme was initialised at the first 
instance by the central government and carried out through a top-down network. Since 
later 1980s, a target responsibility system has been established and functioned well since 
then. The system requires that heads of Party organisations and governments at all levels 
take the full responsibility for implementing population programme, through 
comprehensive management and co-operation between governmental departments and 
non-governmental organisations, and between different development policies and   5
programmes. It aims to ensure the fulfilment of the population growth plan that is set up 
for each locality.  Meanwhile, individual cadres’ career development and position 
promotion would be closely affected by their achievements in family planning work.  
The basic principles of the family planning programme are ”to promote late 
marriage and deferred childbearing, to encourage people to have fewer but healthier 
births, to promote the practice of ‘one child per couple’ and to encourage a longer birth 
spacing for couples who have practical difficulties if they only have one child.”  This 
policy took considerable time to develop and the intention for further improvement has 
never been given up, even though the Government repeats the confirmation of ‘keeping 
the family planning policy stable’ each year. 
One of the salient features of China’s family planning programme is its 
decentralised policy formation and operation. Under the general guidance from the 
central government, it is the local governments, primarily the provincial governments that 
are responsible for the formulating and implementation of the programme
5. In other 
words, local authorities have been given some flexibility in adapting the national policy 
in order to accommodate the vast regional differentials in social, economic and cultural 
conditions. As a result, the current family planning regulations can be grouped into four 
major categories
6. (Table 1) 
These varied policies are implemented in different localities. Based on population 
distribution in 2000, Guo and his colleagues claimed that the one-child, 1.5 child, 2 
children and 3 children policies were implemented among 35.4%, 53.6%, 9.7% and 1.3% 
of China’s population respectively
7. In other words, if all Chinese couples follow local 
family planning regulations, the total cohort fertility rate in China should be 1.62 in 
1990s
8. The figure declined to around 1.5 as more Chinese become urban residents.  
                                                           
5 Actually, it is the local People’s Congress, the Chinese Parliament, that with the authority in drafting local 
family planning regulations and making it to be implemented.   
6 Detailed discussion of the issue could be seen in Xie Zhenming, ‘Population Policy and the Family 
Planning Programme’, in Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (eds.), The Changing Population of China, pp.54-
55, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.  
7 Guo Zhigang et al, “Diversity of China‘s Fertility Policy by Policy Fertilityp,  Population Researchđ No.9, 
September, 2003 (in Chinese) 
8 This is refereed as the policy fertility, which is a weighted average assuming reproductive behaviours of 
all couples in different locations and of different nationalities following the local government family 
planning regulations.  The figure was calculated by the State Family Planning Commission in early 1990s 
based on demographic structural pattern (rural-urban, Han-minority, etc.) that was prevailed at that time.    6
 
Table 1: Comparison of Various Local Family Planning Regulations, 1990s 
Group  Major Policy Regulations  Coverage 
1  One child with very few 
exceptions in allowing couples to 
have two children 
All urban residents and rural 
couples in Jiangsu and part of 
Sichuan province 
2  Two children if the first one is a 
girl (1.5 child policy) 
Most rural couples in  19 
provinces 
3  Two children with a four-year 
spacing 
Farmers in 5 provinces and 
autonomous regions 
4  Two  or  three  children  Minorities in the rural areas of 
minority autonomous regions 
5  No numerical regulation  Rural Tibetan population 
Sources: Details of provincial family planning regulations are available at 
www.cpirc.org.cn (accessed 15 Aug. 2002). 
 
The complex policy reflects the greatly varied economic and social realities in 
different Chinese regions. Furthermore, the differential local policy is a compromise 
between the central guidance on population control and the local situation, both in terms 
of socio-economic development and the political commitment of the local government. 
Chinese farmer families can have two children in general, which is rationalized by the 
factors that farmer families depending on strong labour for agricultural production and 
family support (primarily support by married son (s)) for older age security as there is 
almost no well-covered government sponsored pension system operating for Chinese 
farmers. The success of the programme relies on local government commitment, local 
socioeconomic conditions, persistence of local traditional culture, etc.  
Financial incentive and disincentive measures have been widely used in the 
programme. Since 1991, the political commitment to population control has been 
reaffirmed and the mass is widely mobilised once again
9. As a positive result of these 
commitments, financial input for family planning has increased steadily. More personnel 
                                                           
9 Such as the fully implementation of family planning responsibility system, the start of the annual 
conference on population and family planning work which is held during the time of the annual national 
People’s Congress in March, and participated by all central and provincial top leaders.     7
have been recruited and trained to work in the family planning programme. The quality 
of birth control service has to some extent been improved. Moreover, the government 
requires that relevant social and economic policies should be in compliance with the 
population policy. These measures work effectively in terms of public awareness and the 
implementation of population programmes, and play an important role in further fertility 
decline in the 1990s. 
Along with the strong government commitment, the programme has now put more 
emphases on people’s volunteer participation. Couples are expected to, under the general 
guidance of government population policies, make autonomous decisions regarding the 
methods of contraception, birth interval and other reproductive health matters. Efforts 
have been made to promote education and information dissemination, and on provision of 
better, continuous and regular contraceptive service. Moreover, family planning 
programme has extended to other fields relevant to people’s daily life in order to attract 
wide voluntary participation. Various experimental projects relating family programme 
with women’s empowerment and community development have also been carried out. 
Many of them are supported by international organisations such as Ford Foundation. In 
more recent years, more attention has been paid to the provision of social welfare to rural 
elderly who following up the government family planning regulation in the past.  
There are shortcomings as other mass programmes. China's family planning 
programme is heavily reliant on female contraceptive methods
10.  The local family 
planning policies to some extent institutionalise the traditional patriarchal ideas and son 
preference as many provinces allowing rural couples have two children if the first child is a 
daughter. The programme has been promoted for a long time with little strong support 
from other socio-economic institutions, so that it has been mainly implemented through 
government administrative network. The programme requires couples to reduce the 
number of children they produce, but is unable by it itself to provide adequate social 
support for people to adjust their strategy for family formation and necessary 
compensation for couples to alleviate life risks in the context of low fertility. The later 
task is certainly beyond the capacity of the family planning programme. Punitive 
                                                           
10 According to government statistics, male methods accounted for only 14.7 and 13.1 pert cent of total 
contraception in 1994 and 1999 respectively.     8
packages, in some cases became coercive measures, were widely used particularly in the 
1980s by local cadres although the government emphasis on Mass Line and against 
coercion in general. Levying fines become one of the causes of social tension between 
cadres and the public especially in the rural areas. The relationship between societal 
interests and individual rights is also an area that was neglected to some extent.   
 
III. Factors that affecting regional variations in fertility  
  
As discussed in the previous section, the government commitment and population 
programme are major determinants of China’s rapid fertility decline. However, given the 
characteristics of China’s fertility transition, two other factors, the socio-economic 
development, and reproductive culture, must be taken into consideration in any analysis of 
past and future fertility trend in China. China’s fertility transition is a process of diffusion: 
it started from some developed regions and urban centres, and then diffused to other parts 
of China.  There are always marked regional variations in fertility patterns, both in terms 
of the absolute level and the path of change. 
Based on our understanding of the fertility transition, relevant socio-economic 
indicators are chosen and conventional statistic analysis is carried out. As China’s 
marked fertility transition occurred mainly in the three decades of 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s, our analysis uses data of these periods
11. Results from table 2 reveal that the 
general relationships between fertility level and selected socio-economic variables are 
maintained. It means that general development level is negatively correlated to the 
fertility level. Figure 3 is just an example of such close relations.  
Figure 3 about here 
Nevertheless, the relative importance of various socio-economic factors on fertility 
has changed over time. On the whole, the government population policy and programme 
(indicated by Policy TFR) and general level of socio-economic development (represented 
by Per Capita GDP and Consumption, and Proportion of Urban Population etc.) are the 
most crucial determinants of China’s regional fertility variation. (Table 2) 
 
                                                           
11 Data set in Table 4.   9
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients between TFR and selected socio-economic variables  
Variables 1980s  1995  1997-99 
Per Capita GDP  -0.61  -0.74  -0.601 
Proportion of Urban Population  -0.57  -0.71  -0.513 
Per Capita Consumption  -0.55  -0.69  -0.569 
Policy TFR    0.76   0.69    0.792 
Female late Marriage Rate  -0.55  -0.19  -0.193 
Female Contraceptive Prevalence  -0.81  -0.23  -0.334 
Female Illiterate Rate    0.56   0.60  0.713 
Sources: see table 4. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of China’s fertility level by multiple linear regression  
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable TFR 
 1980s  1990s 
Constant 8.992    0.542 
Per Capita GDP  0.289  -1.045 
Per Capita Consumption  -0.916    0.721 
Proportion of Urban Population    0.171  -0.325 
Policy TFR  -0.120    0.420 
Female Contraceptive Prevalence  -0.832    0.056 
Female late Marriage Rate   0.066    0.067 
Female Illiterate Rate   0.051  -0.042 
R
2     0.877    0.775 
F 21.482  10.844 
              Note: All regression coefficients are standard β values.  
 
It could be seen from table 3 that the values of R squared for both 1980s and the 
1990s are very high, which indicates a good fit of the regression model. However, there 
are different signs of many variables between 1980s and the 1990s in the regressions, 
which may cause confusion. In order to assess the relative importance of independent   10
variables, step-wise regression method is employed, which results in a simplified 





X1ğPolicy TFR, X2ğProportion of Urban Population   
The two variables used in the equation are policy TFR and the proportion of urban 
population. They could explain 72.2 per cent of regional fertility variations. Compared to 
the result from table 3, the remaining 5 variables only add 5 percentages more to the 
model. The variable of policy TFR reflects both the government commitment on 
population control and the population composition, ethnic and rural-urban, the above 
analysis shows that there is a strong association between fertility and the proportion of 
urban and minority populations at the aggregated level, provinces with a high proportion 
of urban population and a low proportion of minority population have achieved low 
fertility. It reflects the fact that deliberate fertility control was first adopted by the Han 
population and started in urban and coastal areas, then gradually adopted by other 
minority populations and diffused to rural and inland areas. It also reflects differences in 
the family planning policy and its implementation between Han and minority populations 
and between urban and rural areas. However, we should also note the considerable 
heterogeneity in urbanisation and population's ethnic composition among provinces with 
a similar fertility. 
 
 IV. Socioeconomic impact of fertility transition 
At the launch of the so-called “One-Child-Policy”, the intention was made clear that 
this should be a policy measure for a period of only 20 to 30 years12.  After more than 20 
years of implementation, it has met its primary objective to slow down China’s 
population growth. It estimates China could now have 400 million more people if no 
family planning programme was carried out. On the other hand, there are also profound 
                                                           
12 See Guanyu kongzhi woguo renkou zengzhang wenti zhi quanti gongchan dangyuan, gongqing tuanyuan 
de gongkaixin (An Open Letter to All Members of the Communist Party and Communist Youth League), 
Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 25 Sep. 1980.   11
socio-economic and demographic consequences. Current policy debates have 
concentrated on these issues.  
  In 2000, there were 88.11 million elderly (people over 65 years), and the 
proportion in the total population for the first time in China’s history exceeded 7 per cent, 
indicating that for the country as a whole, China had become an “aged society”.13 The 
total elderly population (aged 65+) increased up to 100.45 million in 2005, occupied 
7.69% of the overall population, an increment of 13.58 million over this five-year period. 
The number is expected to increase by 3 times over the first half of the 21st century.  
An aging population has long been a major challenge facing many cities and the 
wealthier rural areas in the eastern region. In Shanghai, 13 per cent of the city population 
is 65 and above. On the other hand, Qinghai province is projected to enter the aging 
society stage in as late as 2014. Regional variations in population aging are very similar 
to the regional variations in current fertility, indicating that the aging process is mainly 
caused by the pattern of fertility decline. 
China may be the first major country to grow old before it grows rich. By the middle 
2005, China’s urban pension system only covered a total population of 168.68million, 
including about 42 million pensioners and 125 million employees who contribute to the 
pension fund. Only 30 per cent of all urban residents, or 15 per cent of employees, were 
covered by the program, far less than the world average. 
  The soaring number of senior citizens has put a severe strain on China's social 
security, medical care and the social service sector. On the whole, the Chinese pension 
system is still a pay-as-you-go system albeit the introduction of a partly funded multi-
pillar system in the 1990s. The current system is burdened by unfunded liabilities from 
the old system that is called Legacy Debt. The total annual net input from China’s 
Government revenue into pension fund to balance the system amounted to 52.4 billion 
Yuan in 2004, and accumulated input reached 170 billion between 1998 and 2005. There 
is a total deficit of 2.5 trillion Yuan in China’s urban pension system. The estimated ratio 
of implicit pension debt (IPD) to national GDP would range from 80.8 percent to 145.4 
per cent, based on different assumptions of the discount rate used in the simulation.  
                                                           
13 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Communiqué on Major Figures of the 
2000 Population Census, no. 1, 28 Mar. 2001.   12
  The aging issue is much more complicated in China’s countryside.  There is very 
limited social welfare provision to rural elderly, such as five-guarantee system and 
poverty relief subsidies. On the whole, the elderly farmers in China are still depending on 
their families, particularly their sons to provide old age support both in terms of finance 
and service provision. Furthermore, large scale rural-urban migration, indicated by 
millions of young people moving out, has worsened the aging process in China’s rural 
area. 
  An abnormal sex ratio at birth is another issue linked to China’s fertility transition. 
Researchers in the late 1980s attributed the situation mainly to misreporting of births
14. 
However, it soon became clear that it was real and that pre-birth selective abortion in 
favour of boys was the primary cause
15. The continuous and increasing skew in the sex 
ratio at birth indicates that the situation has worsened over the years
16.  It was 108.5 in 
1982 and 110.9 in 1987. It was reported that in 2005 for every 100 new-born girls, there 
were 124 boys, compared to 119.92 in 2000 and 111.42 in 1990
17 . 
Some blamed the rigid implementation of the family planning programme as the 
major cause. Indeed, there is some kind of relationship between the fertility level and 
abnormality of sex ratio at birth. Provinces with a normal or slightly higher sex ratio at 
birth actually belong to two groups. One is where there is a concentration of minority 
people and the fertility rate is relatively higher, the other group is where there is low 
fertility. The most serious problem is occurring in the provinces/regions which fall 
somewhere in between. However, similar abnormality can also be found in South Korea 
and India with very different family planning programmes.
18  
                                                           
14 For example, Zeng Yi, et al., “Causes and Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio 
at Birth in China,” Population and Development Review 19, no.2 (1993): 283-302. 
15 According to the 2000 Population Census, the sex ratio for the 0-4 and 5-9 age groups is 119.5 and 114.4, 
respectively. If misreporting caused the abnormal sex ratio at birth, it would re-appear in the corresponding 
age groups in the census or surveys conducted a few years later.  The consistence between these surveys 
and censuses is a good indicator of the real abnormality of the sex ratio at birth. 
16 Regulations, including heavy penalties, have been set up in many provinces/regions to prevent medical 
doctors from using ultrasound machines to identify the sex of the foetus.  See for example, http://sdrd.sd-
china.com/zfjd/400012 (accessed 23 Nov. 2002). 
17 Report from China’s State Family Planning Commission. See http://www.sfpc.gov.cn/cn/news20020516-
1.htm (accessed 2 Nov. 2002). 
18 See for example, Chai Bin Park and Nam-Hoon Cho, “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-fertility 
Society: Imbalance of Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea,” Population and Development Review 21, no. 1 (1995): 
59-84.   13
The issue is deep rooted in Chinese traditional culture and the currently 
socioeconomic development level as well. Son preference has its rational especially with 
old age security in China’s countryside. The government has applied rigid policy 
measures to fight with the problem, including serious crackdown on illegal sex 
identification. Sex identification of the fetus or sex-selective pregnancy termination for 
non-medical purpose is strictly forbidden and medical personnel involved in this wrong 
conduct will be seriously penalized. Programmes such as "care for girls project", 
"Happiness Project" and the "Spring-bud Programme" have been carried out to promote 
the gender equality.  The government’s target is to balance the currently unbalanced sex 
ratio in 2010. It is not an easy job.  
A marriage squeeze is expected that was revealed by a thorough study on China’s 
population development strategy. It is estimated that there will be 30 million more males 
than women in the age groups of 25-40 by the year of 2025. The Chinese society has to 
cope with the problem seriously regardless the cause of the problem.   
  There are other consequences caused by or closely linked to China’s population 
programme. The different paths of fertility transition have resulted to the varied regional 
patterns of labour force supply, which is on of the major causes of large-scale labour 
migration from rural to urban, and from inland provinces to costal regions.  By the early 
21
st century, the cohort of ‘Single Child’ has amounted to more than 100 million. This 
cohort has many unique characteristics that will have profound effects on China’s future 
socioeconomic development, societal and family structure, and even political reform.   
 
 V. The future perspectives  
In March 2000, Chinese government issued a directive to reaffirm its commitment to 
population control
19. Seven years later, a new document (will be called the Document in 
the following discussion) has been published calling for the continuous efforts in China’s 
                                                           
19 “Decision on Strengthening Population and Family Planning Work, Maintaining low Fertility”(ᇏ܋ᇏန
ݓༀჽܱႿࡆ఼ದ१ა࠹߃ളტ۽ቔ໗ק֮ളტඣ௜֥थק), Directive issued by CCCP and the State 
Council, 2
nd March 2000.   14
population struggle
20. Stabilizing the low fertility level is viewed as a primary task for 
population and family planning programme in the new era, and the 11th Five-Year Plan 
Period is regarded as the critical time for fulfilling this task. It seems certain that the 
Chinese government will maintain its commitment to population control, and will make 
every effort to achieve its population target in the 21st century. The Document pledged to 
keep the nation's population under 1.36 billion by 2010 and under 1.45 billion by 2020. 
The population annual increase rate in China is expected to maintain at a low level, but 
the absolute number of the increase will stand at 8 to 10 million people every year for the 
next 20 or more years. 
There are concerns about the resilience of China’s fertility transition and the 
possibility of fertility rebound if the government, either voluntarily or forced to, loses 
control on population issues.  On the other hand, scholars in favour of relaxation of the 
current population policy warn that once low fertility becomes social norm, it may not be 
possible to reverse the trend no matter what pro-birth policy measures are taken that is 
the experience of Singapore and Japan. The publication of the Document indicates that 
the present population policy will more or less maintain in effects for the coming years, 
allowing some minor modifications.  
Given China’s current socio-political settings, the government population policy will 
decide the basic level of China’s fertility for the coming years. The deviation from this 
line will be determined jointly by the government’s capacity in enforcing its population 
policy and programme, the societal change caused by China’s social, economic and 
political reform, and people’s general desire for family size. 
The transformation of government organisations and functions is under way. The 
basic idea is to make the government focusing on certain important issues and the society 
will take care of the remaining things, or so-called ‘small government and big social 
services’ in Chinese. The government system is undergoing a profound restructure. 
                                                           
20 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Fully 
Enhancing Population and Family Planning Programme and Comprehensively Addressing Population 
Issues” , 17 January, 2007,  http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/en2007-01/news20070124.htm 

   15
China’s Population and Family Planning Law that came into effect as of September 2002 
legalises the position of the family planning programme and its network in China. The 
programme, however, is facing more challenges than ever before.  
Family planning is first and foremost a rural issue in ChinaēEven after more than 
30-years’ rural reform, an extra child means not only an extra helping hand to rural 
household in sharing the agricultural workload in the field and raising farm productivity, 
but also an extra caregiver and provider for the parents in old age.  To promote the family 
planning policy in rural areas, a subsidised pension programme to reward parents with 
only one child or two girls, has been implemented since 2004. The system provides a 
pension-like subsidy of no less than 600 RMB Yuan ($75) each year to rural parents aged 
60 and older who have only one child, or have two daughters. More than 1.35 million 
aged rural parents have already benefited from the subsidy programme which has been 
trialled in more than 10 provinces since 2004, and is going to extend to the whole country 
in the coming years. This is also an incentive for younger parents to exercise birth control. 
At present, the annual cost of the subsidy programme is about 1.2 billion RMB Yuan. 
This programme is one of the initiatives to establish a comprehensive social security 
system for millions of Chinese farmers. The sustainability of the programme needs to be 
tested by time.   
The population issue is an important component of the government’s functions of 
public management and social services. The Document required that fiscal input into 
population and family planning programmes should increase at a rate greater than the 
increase of current fiscal revenues, so as to guarantee the fund availability for 
implementation of family planning programme and other social support and preferential 
measures. Hence, per capita annual fiscal input into population and family planning 
programme at all levels shall reach RMB 30 Yuan per capita
21.  
Efforts have been made aiming to strengthen and improve development of a 
grassroots-focused Reproductive-health and family planning service delivery system. 
However, it is reported that in some local areas, the family planning offices, especially its 
technical unit, is transferred to be non-government institutions and financially 
                                                           
21 The Document, 17 January, 2007,  http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/en2007-01/news20070124.htm   16
independent with partial government subsidies. Other reforms in China’s public health 
and medi-care system may also affect the function and efficiency of the present family 
planning network as village clinics and urban community health centres are given more 
responsibility to deliver reproductive-health service. This change may not directly 
influences the quality of contraceptive service, but may make it more difficult now to 
keep people working for family planning programmes as job security reduces.  Together 
with other administrative restructure, this may affect the capacity of the government in 
carrying out family planning since it has been largely depended on effective 
administrative system.  
There should be no technical difficult for China’s to reach its population target. 
Research and production of contraceptive devices have always been put at a very favourable 
position. The deepened involvement of China into globalisation of world economy may 
further facilitate the introduction of new and more effective birth control methods. If the 
political stabilisation and current path of development in China are maintained, it is quite 
possible for China to maintain a TFR around 1.7-1.8 in the coming years.  
Meanwhile, people’s volunteer participation and free determination will play much 
more important roles in determine the future fertility level in China.  Fundamental 
changes have occurred in China’s society and economy since the opening and reform. 
The same is true in people’s reproductive behaviour. China’s family planning programme 
has been supported in large by the public, particularly from the younger generations.  The 
young generation has been growing up in a drastically changed environment. Their views 
on marriage, childbearing, and family are markedly differentiated from the traditional one. 
Small family norm has been widely accepted by the public, especially in those advanced 
regions and among the young generation. While there have always been gaps between the 
targets of the programme and public acceptance, the gaps reduced with the time passing.  
The society interests remain as the major rational for China’s population policy and 
programme, but individual’s rights get more attention. Population should be treated in a 
more comprehensive manner. Neither too high nor a too low fertility level is conductive 
to the sustained and coordinated process of China’s modernization. It is the author’s 
opinion that government intervention on reproduction will be gradually weakened along   17
with China’s further development and ‘Two Children Family’ will be a universally 
practised family norm in China in the 21st Century.  
 
Main Reference:  
Attane, I & Sun Minglei (1999), ‘Birth Rates and fertility in China: How Credible are 
Recent Data?’, Population: An English Selection, 11,pp.251-260 
 
Banister, Judith, (1992), 'Implications and Quality of China's 1990 Census Data', paper 
presented at the International Seminar on China's 1990 Population Census, 19-23 Oct. 1992, 
Beijing. 
 
Chen Wei,  ‘ China’s Low fertility (zhongguo de dishengyulu)’, in the Special Issue of 
Population Research (renkou yanjiu) 1995. 
 
Cleland. J.  and C. Wilson, (1987), ‘Demand Theories of the Fertility Transition: an 
Iconoclastic View’, Population Studies, 41,1 
 
Department of Policies, Laws and Regulations of the State Family Planning Commission 
(DPLR), (1992), 'A Summary of the Family Planning Regulations in the 28 Administrative 
Units at the Provincial Level of the Country', China Population Sciences (in Chinese), No. 4, 
July 1992, also see China Population Today, Vol. 9, No. 5. 
 
Gu Baochang & Yang Shuzhang, (1991), 'Fertility Trends in Rural China in the 1980s: 
Cohort Effect Versus Period Effect', Asia-Pacific Population Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 3-
34. 
 
Leete, Richard, (1991), 'Fertility Trends and Prospects in East and Southeast Asian 
Countries and Implications for Policies and Programmes', Population Research Leads, 1991. 
 
Peng Xizhe, (1987) “Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's 
Provinces”, Population and Development Review, 13, 4, pp.639-70 
  ---  (1993), “Regional Differentials in China’s Fertility Transition”, in Leete, R. & I. 
Alam (eds.), The Revolution in Asian Fertility, Oxford: Clarendon Press,  
 
Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (eds.), The Changing Population of China, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000. 
 
Zeng Yi, (1995), ‘Has China’s Fertility in 1991 and 1992 been far Below the Replacement 
Level?’, Population Research, May Issue.  
--- (2000), ‘Marriage patterns in Contemporary China’, in Peng & Guo (eds.), The Changing 
Population of China. Oxford: The Blackwell Publishers. Pp.91-100. 
   18



































































































































































































Beijing 1.00    12740.18  3380.9
1  
63.74   1.33 84.51  90.08  11.18 
Tianjin 1.64    13256.40  4515.4
4  
56.54   1.35 62.76  91.66  16.19 
Hebei 2.19    5286.36  1863.2
3  
16.04   1.67 51.76  92.12  22.13 
Shanxi 2.15    4182.33  1673.9
9  
23.36   1.69 64.45  90.25  14.33 
Inner 
Mogolia 
1.97   4204.37  1851.5
1  
31.86   1.80 72.45  91.89  23.60 
Liaoning 1.69   7753.83  3133.1
6  
43.61   1.50 61.55  91.41  12.61 
Jiling 1.85    5000.48  2543.8
4  
40.94   1.50 49.09  73.21  13.80 
Heilongjian
g 
1.88   6350.31  2803.6
5  
43.81   1.44 48.88  93.12  15.50 
Shanghai 0.99    21162.14  6807.0
1  
69.37   1.28 62.43  92.45  15.39 
Jiangsu 1.89    8410.36  2922.2
9  
23.40   1.52 70.59  93.60  27.62 
Zhejiang 1.61   9439.68 3186.0
9  
17.67   1.54 73.72  92.24  25.07 
Anhui 2.25    3841.93  1932.0
8  
16.66   1.61 67.70  90.27  29.67 
Fujian 2.26    8212.25  3336.4
2  
18.00   1.61 49.73  91.25  32.94 
Jiangxi 2.41    3634.64  1681.6
6  
19.97   1.52 29.57  92.94  24.39 
Shandong 2.01    6719.48  2309.8
1  
22.43   1.55 99.05  92.22  32.81 
Henan 2.74    3924.30  1548.4
4  
14.80   1.56 67.00  90.12  23.55 
Hubei 2.29    5085.01  2210.2
5  
24.47   1.55 49.32  92.85  25.46 




2.34   9433.48  4082.3
7  
27.50   1.85 71.59  85.44  22.09 
Guangxi 2.72    3666.72 1833.3
5  
15.31   1.57 61.52  90.09  21.35 
Hainan 2.67    5395.65  2268.4
3  
22.65   1.97 66.94  84.79  27.39 
Sichuan 1.85    3584.76 1764.9
7  
16.06   1.57 34.36  91.23  26.25 
Guizhou 2.85    1960.72 1283.1
5  
12.98   1.74 52.46  92.58  45.00 
Yunnan 2.61    3542.63  1661.7
9  
13.15   2.13 42.89  84.08  39.68 
Xizang 3.48    2332.50  1172.0
8  
13.73   -  -  -  68.98 
Shannxi 2.57    3233.22 1557.2
4  
19.84   1.64 57.28  90.73  28.84 
Gansu 2.05    2781.93  1343.9
2  
17.16   1.58 47.08  88.22  44.52 
Qinghai 2.37    3638.22 1714.2
0  
28.16   2.08 53.67  84.99  55.04 
Ningxia 2.53    3604.47 1674.6
8  
25.39   2.06 45.50  90.26  34.17 
Xinjiang 2.9
2  
5309.63 2351.10  34.02    2.40 82.44 80.77  17.47
China 2.2
0  
6066.64 2427.51  26.98    1.62 58.85 90.40  25.54
Note:  Per Capita GDP refers to Average value of 1994-1998, compatible prices.  
Per Capita Consumption refers to Average of 1995, 1997 and 1998, 1995 price. 
 Proportion of Urban refers to the average of 1991-1994 and 1997 
Policy TFR refers to the weighted average of people covered by different family 
planning regulations in the later 1980s, which remained more or less unchanged in the 
1990s. 
Female late marriage refers to 1995 
Female contraceptive rate refers to the average of 1990, 1993 and 1995 
Female illiterate rate refers to 1996 
Sources:  
1. China Statistics Yearbook, 1985-1999 
2. China Population Statistics Yearbook 1988-1998 
3. China Family Planning Yearbook 1986-1996  
4. Fertility data cited from Chen Wei,  ‘ China’s Low fertility’, in the Special Issue 
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